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 Abstract: We investigate the determinants of the risk management decision for an 
original dataset of North American gold mining firms. We propose explanations based 
on the firm’s financial characteristics, managerial risk aversion and internal corporate 
governance mechanisms. We develop a theoretical model in which the debt and the 
hedging decisions are made simultaneously. Our model suggests that more hedging 
does not always lead to a higher debt capacity when the firm holds a standard debt 
contract, while hedging is an increasing function of the firm’s financial distress costs. 
We then test predictions of our model. To estimate our system of simultaneous Tobit 
equations, we extend, to panel data, the minimum distance estimator proposed by 
Lee (1995). We obtain that financial distress costs, information asymmetry, 
separation between the posts of CEO and chairman of the board positions and 
managerial risk aversion are important determinants of the decision to hedge 
whereas the composition of the board of directors has no impact in such decision. 
Also, our results to not support the conclusion that firms hedge in order to increase 
their debt capacity which seems to confirm our model’s prediction.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Risk management has received a lot of attention in the financial literature. Several theories 
have been put forward to explain why and how corporations manage (or should manage) 
the risks they face [e.g., Stulz (1984); Smith and Stulz (1985); Stulz (1990, 1996); DeMarzo 
and Duffie (1991); Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993); Morellec and Smith (2002), 
Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) and Carpenter (2000)]. 
When we look at the different papers that tested empirically the arguments justifying firm’s 
risk management activities, we can classify them into two groups according to the approach 
used to conduct the tests. A first traditional approach widely adopted consists in a one 
equation model that considers all other decisions made by the firm as exogenous. This 
approach does not capture the interaction between the different policies adopted within the 
firm. To overcome this limit, a second approach has been proposed in more recent papers 
and consists in a system of simultaneous equations that models risk management along with 
another single decision in the firm. Rogers (2002) and Rajgopal and Shelvin (2002) model 
the risk management and the CEO risk-taking incentives as simultaneous and provide 
evidence suggesting that only the hedging decision is affected by the CEO risk-taking 
incentives tied to options. Based on their evidence, we could claim that these two decisions 
are not simultaneously set. Graham and Rogers (2002) also apply the simultaneous 
approach to test the determinants of the risk management decision. Their empirical 
investigation is motivated by theoretical arguments claiming an endogenous relation 
between the debt and the risk management policies. Indeed, Smith and Stulz (1985) suggest 
that the firm’s hedge ratio should be an increasing function of the firm’s financial distress 
costs and consequently of its leverage, whereas Stulz (1996) and Leland (1998) suggest that 
the tax advantage of financing with debt should be greater for firms that manage risk, 
because risk management can lead to a higher debt capacity. Therefore, one has to model 
the debt as endogenous when studying the determinants of the risk management decision. 
Graham and Rogers (2002) and Borokhovich et al (2004) have recently provided empirical 
support for these hypotheses. 
This paper fits into the simultaneous approach framework. We investigate the determinants 
of the risk management activity under an endogenous debt policy for a sample of North 
American gold mining firms. Our work differs from that of Graham and Rogers (2002) on 
four points. First, we conduct our tests using a hand collected panel dataset covering a 
seven-year period instead of a cross sectional dataset. Our dataset allows us not only to 
capture differences in risk management policies among firms but also to follow the 
evolution of this policy over a long period of time. Econometrically speaking, the model we 
aim to estimate corresponds to two simultaneous Tobit equations with two censored 
dependent variables and panel data. Estimating such a system is a very challenging task 
and, to our knowledge, no methodology exists in the literature to do so. We overcome this 
problem by extending the minimum distance estimator proposed by Lee (1995) to a panel 
dataset. Such a methodology would be very useful to researchers wishing to estimate 
different forms of simultaneous equations with panel data.  
 
Second, to measure the firm’s hedging activity, we use the delta percentage instead of the 
value of the net position held by the firm on derivative contracts for non-trading purposes.   3
The delta percentage, first used by Tufano (1996) and more recently by Dionne and Garand 
(2003), is defined as the delta of the risk management portfolio held by the firm divided by 
its expected production. Since a risk management strategy implies decisions concerning 
both the amount of risk to hedge and the instruments employed to hedge, using the net 
position as a measure of risk management leads to an information loss regarding the 
instruments
1. We think that the delta percentage more suitably describes the firm’s risk 
management activities in the firm because its calculation includes information on both the 
level of hedging and the types of instruments utilised to hedge. 
 
Third, we propose internal corporate governance characteristics as possible explanations of 
a firm’s risk management policy. We think that corporate governance in general and the 
composition of the board in particular could explain this policy. Indeed, Borokhovich et al 
(2004) and Whidbee and Wohar (1999) have reported evidence suggesting that the 
proportion of unrelated directors is positively related to the firm’s use of interest rate 
derivatives. These findings are consistent with hedging in the interests of shareholders. 
However, we know that at least some of the firm’s risk management activity is designed to 
maximise the manager’s utility rather than the firm’s value. Tufano (1996) and more 
recently Pertersen and Thiagarajan (2000) have confirmed this hypothesis for the gold 
mining industry. Also, the recent scandals reported in the financial press clearly showed 
that the board of directors is not always the watchdog that it is supposed to be. Since 
hedging usually involves off-balance operations, manipulating the firm’s hedging activities 
is often easier than manipulating the firm’s accounting measures. We are therefore inclined 
to think that managers who are also chairmen of the board and those facing a weaker board 
would increase their risk management level if this activity enhanced their utility.  
 
Fourth, we propose a theoretical model where the debt and the risk management decisions 
are set simultaneously as a background for our empirical investigation. Our model suggests 
that, under a standard debt contract, hedging is always an increasing function of the firm’s 
financial distress costs but that it does not always lead to a higher debt capacity. 
Interestingly, our empirical evidence shows that the effect between these two decisions 
goes in only one direction not as reported in Graham and Rogers (2002) and more recently 
by Borokhovich et al (2004). This finding partially supports the prediction of our 
theoretical model.  
 
It is also worth noting that in the case of the gold mining industry there is mixed evidence 
as to the validity of the theoretical arguments explaining the risk management policies. 
Indeed, Tufano (1996) claims that firms hedge mainly to increase the manager’s utility 
whereas Dionne and Garand (2003) report evidence validating the maximisation of the 
firm’s value argument. In order to check the robustness of our findings to the debt 
endogeneity hypothesis, we run regressions for both the single and the simultaneous 
models. 
 
                                                           
1 The problem with the value of the net position held by the firm on derivative contracts for non-trading 
purposes is that it does not distinguish between the different derivative contracts and may lead to conclude 
that a firm having a $90 millions long position in options and a $50 millions short position in futures-a net 
position of $40 millions- is having the same risk management strategy as a firm having a long position of $40 
millions only in the forward markets.    4
Our results suggest that financial distress costs, informational asymmetry and managerial 
risk aversion do affect the risk management strategy even when we control for the 
endogenous relation between the risk management and the debt decisions. This statement 
does not hold for the tax and size arguments. Also, the composition of the board of 
directors seems to play no active role in decisions on risk management policy, whereas 
CEOs who are also chairmen of the board hedge more with financial instruments. These 
findings are partially consistent with hedging to enhance the manager’s utility.  
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into six sections. Section 1 proposes a theoretical 
model where the debt and the hedging decisions are simultaneously made as well as the 
hypothesis drawn from the model. Section 2 describes our sample and the different 
variables we use in the analysis. In section 3, we explain the methodology we propose to 
estimate our system of simultaneous equations with panel data.  Section 4 reports the 
results of the univariate analysis while section 5 presents the results for the multivariate 
analysis. We report results for two models: one where the debt is set exogenous and one 
where the debt is endogenized. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
1. THE ENDOGENOUS RELATION BETWEN RISK MANAGEMENT AND DEBT 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) argue that (1) if financial distress is costly and (2) if 
debt provides a fiscal advantage or a reduction in agency costs, risk management can be 
used to increase the debt capacity. The argument that risk management can affect the debt 
policy can also be found in Stulz (1996), Leland (1998) and Graham and Rogers (2002). In 
this section we propose a theoretical model that considers simultaneously the hedging and 
borrowing decisions. Our model extends the general framework of costly state verification 
developed by Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985)
2. Indeed, we consider two 
random variables along with two decisions variables: F the face value of debt or the amount 
to be paid to creditors, and h the hedge ratio. Unlike Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), we 
do not focus on the way investment policy is financed but rather on the simultaneous 
decision making of the hedging and borrowing policies for a given investment decision. 
This model will serve as a theoretical background to the empirical tests conducted later in 
the paper. 
 
A. The model 
We focus on linear hedging strategies because they are more popular in hedging 
commodity risk
3. We assume that the mining firm produces gold and holds another asset or 
commodity whose price cannot be hedged by derivative instruments or insurance policies. 
The firm’s revenues will depend mainly on the gold return but also on the return generated 
by the second asset. We design the model in such a way that both revenues can be 
correlated. The firm’s total revenue w is modeled as follow: 
                                                           
2 This model is also in the spirit of Caillaud, Dionne and Jullien (2000).  
3 The 1998 Wharton survey of financial risk management by US non-financial firms indicates that “options 
are generally less popular than forwards in the FX area, swaps in the IR area and futures in the CM 
area…..FX options were the most common, used by 44% of derivatives-using firms, while IR and CM were 
used by just 28% of derivatives-using firms”.      5
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where  0 w  corresponds to the firm’s revenues from gold in certainty, x to the random gold 
return
4, h to the hedge ratio, and y to the random revenue generated by the second asset in 
place. To simplify the presentation, we define y as equal to  0 xw α  where α  is a measure of 
the correlation between both revenues. The firm must choose simultaneously the level of 
hedging h and the face value of its debt F in order to maximise the following program
5: 
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D is the amount of debt contracted by the firm, 
c are the audit costs paid by creditors in the bankruptcy states, 
r is the interest rate during the period, 
) (x g  and  ) (x G  are respectively the density and cumulative distribution function of x. To 
make things simple, we assume that x is distributed normally with a mean of 1 and a 
standard deviation ofσ
6, 
F x is defined such that  [] 0 ) 1 ( 0 0 = − + − + F w x x h h w F F α  and corresponds to the minimal 
value of x that allows the firm to avoid bankruptcy. 
 
The maximization problem in (2) and (3) yields the following first order conditions (See 
Appendix I for details) with λ corresponding to the Lagrange multiplier for (3): 
 
                                                           
4 For a gold mining firm,  0 w  corresponds to the current forward price of gold multiplied by the total 
production of the firm while x corresponds to the ratio of the revenues obtained if the production is sold later 
on the spot market divided by the revenues obtained if the production is sold at the current forward price. 
5 In this case we consider the amount of debt and not the form of the debt contract as endogenous which 
means that the firm chooses strategically its hedging ratio and the face value of its debt under a standard debt 
contract.   
6 This hypothesis was first proposed by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) to get an analytical expression for 



















































The first equation in (4) looks familiar; it resembles the condition for a standard debt 
contract. According to these equations λ will be greater than 1 (a standard result for a debt 
contract) as long as 1-h 0 > +α and 0 ) 1 ( 0 > + − α w F . In the following, we limit our 
analysis to the standard debt contract by assuming that these two conditions are satisfied. 
















































































. Let’s suppose for the moment that α =0 (the firm generates its 
revenues only from the selling of gold and therefore has just one source of uncertainty 
affecting its revenues). In this case, for a given * F , the optimal hedge ratio  * h will be lower 
than 1. 
 
This result does not confirm Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) conclusion that the optimal 
hedge ratio will be equal to one when the firm has a single source of risk. This can easily be 
explained by the difference in the settings of the two models. Recall that in the Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1993) the firm captures the total benefit of hedging because it hedges 
only its internal revenues, whereas, in our model the firm hedges its total revenues and 
therefore does not fully capture the benefits of hedging. Indeed, the firm hedges both the 
part of its revenues it keeps and the part it reimburses to the creditors which means that a 
fraction of the hedging benefits will be captured by the creditors. Therefore, in our case the 
firm will be less inclined to set its hedge ratio at the maximum (full hedging). 
 
More generally, when  0 < α  the optimal hedge ratio will be lower than in the  0 = α case, 
meaning that firms having negatively correlated revenues will benefit from a natural 
hedging that decreases their need for hedging with derivatives. We can also show that when 
α > 0, the optimal hedge ratio will be greater than in the previous two cases and can even 
be greater than 1.   7
 
Equation (5) shows that * F , the face value of a standard debt contract is increasing in 
2 σ and in the hazard rate. Also, for a fixed value of the hazard rate,  * F  is a decreasing 
function of * h . This means that if the default intensity were independent from the level of 
hedging and debt, firms that hedge more would be able to reduce the face value of their 
debt. This result confirms the argument that hedging could increase the firm’s debt 
capacity. However, the default intensity (the hazard rate) is usually not constant and we can 
even verify that it is increasing in x when the latter is normally distributed. Therefore, the 
relation between hedging and debt will not be as obvious. Equation A3 in Appendix I 
shows that under the standard debt contract, a higher hedging level will decrease the firm’s 
face value. However, since firms will be able to contract more debt – because they 
reimburse less per dollar borrowed- they can end up with a higher default intensity and face 
value for their debt. This will yield to an indirect second positive effect between hedging 
and debt making the relation between both variables not obvious. 
 
Using the conclusions provided by our model we can now enunciate two hypotheses that 
we will test in the empirical section when the debt is set endogenous: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The firm’s hedging ratio is an increasing function of the firm’s default 
intensity. Since financially distressed firms support higher distress costs we should observe 
a positive relation between h (the hedge ratio) and the firm’s financial distress costs. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The firm’s hedge ratio has two opposite effects on the debt face value. We 
will investigate empirically the net effect for the gold mining industry.  
 
 
2. SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND VARIABLES 
 
A. The delta percentages 
 
The initial data on the delta percentages comes from Dionne and Garand (2003). They 
document 898 quarter-company risk management observations (the delta percentages) 
relative to 45 North American gold mining companies over the 1992-1998 period. We first 
updated their sample by including data relative to the 1999 year. The information used to 
calculate the delta percentages was gracefully provided by Ted Reeve, a Canadian analyst 
specializing in the gold mining industry
7. The delta percentage for a given quarter is the 
fraction of the planned gold production that is being hedged over the next three years. To 
obtain the delta percentage for each firm-quarter, we first have to calculate the deltas of 
each instrument that is used to hedge the production over the next three years. Each delta is 
then multiplied by the ounces of gold that are covered by the corresponding instrument, so 
as to obtain what Tufano (1996) calls the delta ounces. Then, we have to take the sum of 
the different delta ounces in order to obtain the delta of the hedge portfolio held by a firm. 
Finally, we calculate the delta percentage as the delta of the hedge portfolio divided by the 
                                                           
7 For a number of years, Ted Reeve published quarterly reports containing detailed three-year information on 
hedging activities for North American gold mining firms over the future three years.   8
expected gold production over the same three years that are used for the hedge variable
8. As 
Table I shows, the delta percentage is highly dispersed among firms which motivate the 
analysis of its determinants. Most firms composing our sample have delta percentages 
ranging between 0 and 50%, which indicates that these firms use derivative hedging mainly 
to reduce gold price risk rather than to speculate. Table II also suggests that the risk 
management activity becomes more popular as we approach the end the 1990s. This is 
probably caused by the growing popularity of the derivatives market over the same period. 
 
(Insert Tables I AND II) 
 
B. The sample 
 
For each firm-quarter observation, we collected data from COMPUSTAT Quarterly on the 
firm’s market value, leverage, liquidity, acquisition expenses, operating income, selling and 
general expenses, depreciation and amortization as well as on the book value of its 
property, plant and equipment and sales. The data relative to the firm’s operating cash cost 
and exploration expenditures was hand collected from quarterly reports. Data on directors 
and officers shareholdings and options holdings, the percentage of shares owned by 
institutions, the board size and composition were hand collected from the proxy statements 
and annual reports. Some of the companies in our initial sample had to be dropped because 
they had been acquired, had filed for bankruptcy or simply because their management was 
unable to locate the proxy statements or quarterly reports for the fiscal years we requested
9. 
Our proxy for taxable income is taxable accounting earnings before extraordinary items and 
discounted operations. This input is needed to construct the taxsave and the marginal tax 
rate variables. Our final sample consists of 485 quarter-company observations relative to 36 
North American gold mining companies: 25 Canadian and 11 US. It ranges over the period 
running from January 1993 to December 1999. 
 
C. The Variables in the risk management equation 
 
C.1. Unobservable Imperfections: information asymmetry 
 
Stulz (1990) claims that firms will manage risk to decrease cash flow volatility because it 
reduces one of the costs related to managerial discretion in the presence of information 
asymmetry about the managerial actions. DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) confirm that a risk 
management strategy can be profitable for shareholders faced with information asymmetry 
about the dividend stream. Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) also consider asymmetric 
information as a determinant of hedging. The asymmetry in their case concerns the 
competence level of management; here, risk management can reduce the noise in the 
learning process concerning the managers’ capacities. In this case, risk management is a 
signal of a manager’s quality and superior ability. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) show that 
even if the information asymmetry concerns the source and magnitude of the risks the firm 
                                                           
8 For more details concerning the construction of the delta percentage, see Tufano (1996). 
9 We needed data from proxy statements and quarterly reports ranging from January 1991 to December 1999. 
These documents were unavailable on EDGAR (for US firms) or SEDAR (for Canadian firms) for many 
cases, especially in SEDAR where data is not available before January 1997. We had to contact the firms and 
ask them to send us their proxy statements and quarterly reports for the quarters we needed.   9
faces rather than the manager’s ability, risk management does benefit shareholders and 
increases the value of the firm.  As in Graham and Rogers (2002), we measure 
informational asymmetry by the percentage of shares held by institutions. Indeed, 
institutions are very exigent shareholders who typically have privileged access to 
management information and facilitate its processing in the financial markets. Therefore, 
we expect a negative coefficient for this variable. 
 
C.2. Observable Imperfections 
 
Taxes: The tax argument introduced by Smith and Stulz (1985) suggests that in the 
presence of a convex tax function, hedging reduces the variability of the firm’s pre-tax 
value and its tax liability because it locks the taxable earnings in a predefined level. This 
prediction is confirmed by results reported, among others, in Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993). 
 
We measure the tax function’s convexity using a modified version of the simulation 
approach proposed by Graham and Smith (1999)
10. We expect a positive relation between 
this variable and the delta percentage when the debt decision is set exogenous. Things will 
be less obvious when the debt decision is endogenous because debt provides also a tax 
advantage than can make tax savings generated by hedging less significant. We calculate 
the tax savings resulting from a five percent reduction in the volatility in order to be 
consistent with the empirical findings reported in Guay (1999). Unfortunately, it is 
impossible for us to construct the tax save variable on quarterly basis so we calculate it on 
an annual basis and suppose that it is constant for the four quarters of the year. For each 
firm-year t observation, we first collect all available data on taxable incomes from 
COMPUSTAT annual files for previous years, in order to calculate the drift  i µ and the 
volatility of the innovations on a rolling historical basis. Next, using the drift and volatility 
estimates, we generate for each US firm a normal variable ε with 18 realisations (15 years 
to account for carry forwards and 3 years to account for carry backs). In the United Stated, 
since late 1998, a net operating loss can be carried back 2 years and forward 20 years. 
However, because our sample ranges mainly from 1991 to 1998, we use the old legislation 
that allows firms to carry back losses for 3 years and forward for 15 years. For Canadian 
firms, we generate a normal variable with only 10 realisations because the Canadian 
legislation allows firms to carry back net operating losses for 3 years and forward only for 7 
years only. Then, we use the normal variables generated to simulate taxable incomes from 
t+1 to t+18 for US firms and from t+1 to t+10 for Canadian ones. Taxable income for firm i 
in year t (TIit) is supposed to follow a random walk variable as follows: 
 
  it i it TI ε µ + = ∆  
 
                                                           
10 Graham and Smith (1999) treat Canadian and US firms drawn from COMPUSTAT identically by applying 
the American legislation and tax code to their whole sample. We think that it is more appropriate to use the 
legislation of its original country for each firm. Graham and Smith (1999) also repeat the procedure 50 times 
only, which could be insufficient when dealing with simulations. Therefore, we repeat our simulation 1000 
times. 
   10
Next, we calculate the tax liability for each firm in each year t using the simulated future 
taxable incomes and historical taxable incomes for year’s t-3, t-2 and t-1. For each firm, we 
consider the tax plan corresponding to its home country. We then suppose a five-percentage 
decrease in the volatility calculated in the first step and recalculate the tax liability. The tax 
save variable is calculated as the difference between the tax liability paid in the full 
volatility case, and the tax liability paid in the reduced volatility case. We perform this 
procedure 1000 times for each firm in each year. The expected tax savings are then 
obtained by averaging the 1000 tax save values calculated. As in Graham and Rogers 
(2002), we scale the expected tax saving by the sales in the regression analysis. 
 
Financial Distress Costs: Under the financial distress argument first proposed by Smith and 
Stulz (1985), hedging increases shareholders’ wealth because it decreases the expected 
value of direct bankruptcy costs and the loss of the debt tax shield. As in Tufano (1996), we 
measure financial distress costs with two variables: cash cost and leverage. Cash costs 
measures the operating costs of producing one ounce of gold, excluding all non-cash items 
such as depreciation, amortisation and other financial costs. The second variable used is 
leverage measured as the book value of the long-term debt divided by the firm’s market 
value. We should observe a positive relation between the delta percentage and both 
variables measuring the financial distress costs. 
 
Firm size: We use the natural logarithm of the firm’s sales revenues to control for firm size. 
If the risk management costs are proportional to the firm’s size as stated in Smith and Stulz 
(1985), small firms should hedge more and we should obtain a negative coefficient for this 
variable. However, if the risk management costs are fixed, larger firms might hedge more 
especially when these costs are substantial. 
 
Investment Opportunities: Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) argue that when external 
financing is more costly than internal financing, firms with attractive investment 
opportunities will adopt higher risk management levels to ensure the availability of more 
internally generated funds. They present the risk management strategy as a tool to reduce 
the under investment problem. Morellec and Smith (2002) also argue that when managers 
have control over the financial policy, their incentive to hedge increases with the firm’s 
investment opportunities. In their model, hedging has two opposite effects on manager’s 
risk shifting incentive: (1) first hedging decreases the firm’s free cash flow level and 
therefore constrains the manager’s investment policy in the short run, (2) second hedging 
decreases the firm’s financial distress costs and improves its credit risk which leads to an 
increase in the investment level in the long run. This second effect of hedging tends to 
dominate the first as the number of investment opportunities increases. Consequently, the 
manager’s incentives to hedge would be positively associated with the number of growth 
options available in the firm. The positive relation between the firm’s investment 
opportunities and its risk management activities was confirmed by results reported in Nance 
et al (1993); Géczy et al (1997); Gay and Nam (1999) and Knopf, Nam and Thornton 
(2002). 
 
Our proxies for the firm’s investment opportunities are the exploration expenditures and the 
acquisitions expenditures both scaled by the firm’s market value. In fact, gold mining 
companies can decide to expand either internally by exploring new mines or externally by   11
acquiring already existing mines. If firms use risk management to ensure internally 
generated funds to pursue those activities, we should observe a positive relation between 
the delta percentage and these two variables. 
 
C.3. Managerial Risk Aversion 
 
Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) were among the first to discuss managerial risk 
aversion as a possible explanation for risk management. According to Smith and Stulz 
(1985), a manager will hedge less as long as his expected utility is a convex function of the 
firm value, even if his expected utility is a concave function of his personal wealth. 
Though, managers with large holdings in options will seek more risk than the ones with no, 
or small options holdings. On the other hand, compensation packages that lead to a concave 
function between the manager’s expected utility and the firm’s value will encourage 
managers to hedge more. Consequently, managers holding a significant fraction of the 
firm’s shares would search more hedging. Tufano (1996), Rajgopal and Shelvin (2002) and 
Rogers (2002) show that the hedging level is a decreasing function of managers’ options 
holdings. These results seem to confirm the robustness of the Stulz (1984) and Smith and 
Stulz (1985) models. However, Carpenter (2000) argues that option compensation does not 
automatically lead to more risk seeking. Under some conditions, giving risk adverse 
managers more options incite them to reduce the firm value volatility and thus adopt higher 
levels of risk management. This prediction is confirmed by results reported in Knopf, Nam 
and Thornton (2002), and explains the positive relation between option detentions and 
hedging reported in Géczy et al (1997) and Gay and Nam (1999). 
 
We measure managerial risk aversion by two variables: the value of the common shares 




C.4. Other control variables 
 
Corporate governance variables: In some cases, managers hedge more, not in order to 
decrease the firm’s financial distress costs, tax liability or underinvestment costs but simply 
to increase their own utility. This situation is more likely to occur when managers have 
greater discretionary power to make sub optimal decisions from a shareholder perspective. 
Unrelated directors and the separation between the CEO and the chairman of the board 
                                                           
11 Unfortunately, we were unable to get any information on option holdings on a quarterly basis and we just 
assume that the number of options owned by directors and officers to be constant through over the fiscal year. 
This hypothesis does not seriously violate the reality since firms usually wait for fiscal year end performance 
to determine the number of options it will grant to its directors and officers. 
12 We did not use the sensitivities of D&O option portfolio to stock return and stock return volatility (the 
Delta and Vega of the option portfolio) as proxies for managerial risk aversion because of data limitation. 
Also, recall that the Core and Guay (2002) method relies on the dividend-adjusted Black & Scholes model to 
estimate the sensitivities of the D&O option portfolio to stock return and stock return volatility. As stated in 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), the partial derivatives used to calculate the sensitivities, likely overstates the 
real values of the ESO risk incentive (Vega) and the ESO wealth effect (Delta). Consequently, we use the 
value of common shares owned by directors and officers, and the number of options held by directors and 
officers as proxies for managerial risk aversion. We are aware that those variables have their own limitations 
but we think they still represent acceptable proxies of managerial risk aversion.   12
responsibilities are usually adopted as mechanisms to limit the managerial discretion. These 
mechanisms are supposed to lead to an optimal level of hedging. In this sense, Borokhovich 
et al (2004) report a positive relation between the number of outside directors on the board 
and the quantity of interest rate hedging held by the firm. We use two variables as proxies 
for internal corporate governance mechanisms: the number of unrelated directors as a 
percentage of the board size and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board
13. If the coefficients of the two variables proxying for internal 
corporate governance mechanisms are respectively positive and negative, the evidence 
would be consistent with corporate hedge in the interest of shareholders. 
 
Financial slack: Derivatives and gold loans are not the only tools firms can employ to 
manage gold price risk. Indeed, instead of hedging price risk with financial instruments, 
gold mining firms can simply decide to support themselves the losses caused by an adverse 
movement in the gold market. Usually, firms that decide to retain their own losses will 
form liquidity cushions intended to facilitate such retention. Consequently, the existence of 
the financial slack should be negatively associated with the level of risk management 
through financial instruments. Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) and Tufano (1996) have 
reported empirical results that support such a hypothesis for models where the debt decision 
is set exogenous. However, this negative relation might disappear in a model where the 
debt decision is set endogenous particularly if the additional financial slack comes from the 
firm’s credit line. We include the quick ratio in the regression to proxy the firm’s financial 
slack and we expect a negative coefficient for this variable at least when the debt decision 
is set exogenous. The quick ratio is defined as the value of the cash on hand, short term 
investments and clients’ accounts divided by the short term liabilities. 
 
Finally, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is US to control for the firm’s 
nationality. 
 
D. Variables in the debt equation 
 
The dependent variable in the debt specification is leverage measured as the book value of 
long-term debt divided by the firm’s market value. We incorporate the delta percentage as 
an independent variable. A positive and significant coefficient will confirm Graham and 
Rogers (2002) findings and indicate that firms hedge in order to increase their debt 
capacity. However, the results drawn from our theoretical model suggest that hedging will 
not lead to a higher debt capacity if the second effect (an increase in the default intensity) 
prevails or is significant enough to neutralize the first one (a decrease of the firm’s risk). 
Therefore, we can not predict a sign for the delta percentage coefficient. 
 
The other independent variables are standard in the literature (e.g., Titman and Wessels 
(1988)). For example, we use the book value of property, plant and equipment divided by 
the book value of total assets as a proxy for the firm’s collateral value, on the grounds that 
firms with more tangible assets can use them as collateral to contract more debt. Hence, we 
expect a positive coefficient for this variable. Our proxy for the non-debt tax shield is 
depreciation and amortisation divided by the book value of total assets. We expect a 
                                                           
13 Refer to Table III for a complete description of how we define a director as unrelated.   13
negative coefficient for this variable because tax deductions provided by depreciation and 
amortisation can be substitutes to the tax advantage generated by debt. 
 
The third variable used in the debt equation is the marginal tax rate (MTR)
14. We expect a 
positive coefficient for this variable because a higher MTR will mean a higher tax 
advantage for financing with debt. In the debt equation, we also include the exploration and 
acquisitions expenditures of the firm scaled by its market value as proxies for the firm’s 
growth opportunities. We expect a negative coefficient for both variables. According to 
Titman and Wessels (1988), growth opportunities cannot be collateralised nor will they 
generate tax deductions, causing firms with important growth opportunities to carry less 
debt in their capital structure. The variable we incorporate as a proxy for the firm 
uniqueness is its selling, general and administrative expenses divided by its net sales. We 
expect a negative sign for this variable. Our debt specification also contains a proxy for 
size: the natural logarithm of the firm’s sales revenues. Big firms are supposed to be more 
diversified and therefore less likely to suffer from financial distress. This argument 
suggests that bigger firms should be more leveraged. Furthermore, larger firms can benefit 
from economies of scale and issue long-term debt at lower costs than smaller firms. Larger 
firms should then carry more long-term debt than smaller ones. We also control for the 
firm’s profitability because profitable firms generate more internal funds and are supposed 
to need less external financing by debt or equity. Our proxy for profitability is the firm’s 
operating income divided by the value of its sales. We expect a negative coefficient for this 
variable. The volatility of the percentage change in the operating income of the firm is also 
included in the debt specification. This variable is used as a proxy for the firm’s operating 
risk and we expect a negative coefficient for it. Firms with a high operating risk are 
supposed to carry less debt in order to lower their financial risk and keep their total risk at a 
reasonable level. Finally, we include a dummy variable in the debt equation to control for 
the firm’s nationality.  
 
Table III summarizes the different variables used in the regression analysis. 
 





We use a Tobit model to estimate the single equation model in order to account for the 
censoring of the dependent variable. Moreover, our sample consists of panel data and we 
had to choose between a random effect and a fixed effect specification. We opted for a 
random firm effect model because the fixed effect specification suffers from the incidental 
parameters problem described by Neyman and Scott (1948). Indeed, Greene (2002) shows 
that the incidental parameters problem does not lead to biased estimates of the slope in the 
                                                           
14 Graham (1996) defines the marginal tax rate as the expected value of additional taxes paid on an additional 
dollar of income earned today. We construct the marginal tax rates for the firms in our sample with a 
procedure similar to the one we used for the tax save variable. In this case, we do not reduce volatility by 5 
percent to calculate the new tax bill, we simply add 1 dollar to the taxable income of year t for which we want 
to compute the MTR, we then calculate the new tax bill. The MTR is defined as the difference between the 
new and the old tax bill.   14
case of a Tobit specification, but does cause a downward bias in the estimated standard 
deviations. Such problem might lead to erroneous conclusions concerning the statistical 
significance of the variables used in the regressions. Since we are more interested in testing 
the significance rather than the economic impact of each theory, we opted for the random 
firm effect Tobit specification. 
 
The estimation of the model where the debt is set endogenous does however present some 
econometric challenges. In fact, the system consists of two simultaneous equations with 
two censored dependent variables. Also, recall that our sample consists of panel data. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to find in the literature an estimation procedure for a system 
similar to ours. We propose to use the minimum distance estimation technique (MDE 
hereafter) originally proposed by Amemiya (1978) because, in our case, it is a suitable 
technique that provides unbiased and consistent estimates of the system structural form 
coefficients when the error terms in the equations might be correlated. Lee (1995) applies 
the MDE to a system of three simultaneous equations with respectively a censored, a 
dichotomous and a regular dependent variable. However, his procedure can only be applied 
to cross sectional data. We extended Lee’s reasoning to develop our methodology and 
obtain estimates of the coefficients for the two equations of our system.  
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where  *
1it y and  *
2it y  are respectively the risk management level and the long-term debt level 
targeted by the firm,  it X1 and  it X2 are ( 1 1× k ) and ( 1 2 × k ) vectors of exogenous variables 
(including a constant term) supposed to affect respectively the risk management and the 
debt decisions. The terms u and e correspond respectively to the random firm effect and 
error components. α ’s andβ are parameters to be estimated. Only maximum ( *
1it y ,0), 
maximum ( *
2it y ,0),  it X1  and  it X2  are observed. We assume that  ) , ( 2 1 i i u u and ) , ( 2 1 it it e e are 
respectively jointly normally distributed with a zero mean and that 1 21 12 ≠ ×α α . 
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where  it X ′  is a vector containing all the exogenous variables in the system such 
that [ ] 12 , it it it XX X ′′ ′ = ,  1 η and  2 η are the reduced form parameters vectors,  t l1 and  t l2 are the   15
reduced form random firm effects; and  it 1 γ and  it 2 γ are the error terms. Let’s 
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The first step of the MDE procedure consists in estimating the reduced form parameters. In 
our case, each equation in the reduced form corresponds to a random firm effect Tobit 
model. We estimate the equations by the Maximum Likelihood method. This step provides 
us with estimates of etas (η ), thetas (θ ) and sigmas (σ ). Next, the relationships between 
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where  1 J  and  2 J are the exclusion matrices constructed such as:  it it X J X 1 1 ′ = ′  
and it it X J X 2 2 ′ = ′ . These restrictions are used to recover consistent but inefficient estimates 
of the structural form parameters. To do so, we replace  1 η and  2 η  by  1 ˆ η and  2 ˆ η  obtained 
from step one, add an error term  k ω (k=1,2) to each equation in (8) and then apply OLS. 
The last step of the procedure consists in calculating a variance-covariance matrix based 
upon the effective scores for ETAs from each reduced form equation, and use it as a 
weighting matrix to get efficient estimates of the structural form parameters. Lee (1995) 
defines the effective score for ETAs as the residual of regressing the score for the ETA on 
the score of the error term standard deviation. In our case, the score for the error term 
standard deviation will be a matrix with two elements: one is corresponding to the score for 
θ  (the standard deviation of the random firm effect) and one is corresponding to the score 
for σ  (the standard deviation of the error term). The effective score calculation requires the 
computation of the log likelihood derivatives w.r.tη , θ  and σ which could be a very long 
and difficult task to achieve. To overcome this problem, we first construct the log 
likelihood function corresponding to a random firm effect Tobit model and then evaluate 
the derivatives numerically using the derivative definition. Numerical integration is done 
using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule. The log likelihood function of a random firm 
effect Tobit model is presented in Appendix III. The effective scores for ETAs are then 
multiplied by the inverted information matrix and used, along with the inefficient estimates   16
of the structural form parameters obtained from the previous step, as inputs to calculate the 
variance covariance matrix. Finally we estimate the whole system by a procedure 
analogous to a SURE method. 
 
 
4. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
Tables IV and V report the descriptive statistics for the main independent variables used in 
the regression analysis as well as some statistical tests. We break the sample down into 
three groups according to the level of the risk management adopted by the firm. The first 
group uses no risk management (delta percentage equal to 0%), the second group uses 
moderately risk management (delta percentage between 0
+% and 50%) and the third group 
uses extensively risk management (more than 50%). The last four columns in Table V 
report the p-values corresponding to the t-test of the differences in means between the 
groups (column 10 and 11), and the significance level of the non parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sum test for differences between the median of the groups (12 and 13).  The p-values 
reported in column (10) of Table V, show that firms using an extensive level of risk 
management are very different from those with no risk management activities. Indeed, the 
firms in the extensive level group have higher financial distress costs measured both by 
leverage and cash cost, carry less liquidity and have lower institutional shareholding than 
those using no risk management. They are also twice as large in terms of sales revenues and 
three times as large in terms of market value. And, the managers of the extensive risk 
management group have a larger equity stake value in the firm and hold more options. This 
is possibly due to the larger size of these firms. In fact, larger firms are more likely to suffer 
from agency costs generated by conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders, 
because their activities are more complex to monitor. Therefore, larger firms have a greater 
incentive to offer their managers compensation packages containing stocks and options in 
order to align their interests with those of the shareholders. Another possible explanation is 
that larger firms are more difficult to manage and consequently their managers deserve 
higher compensations. Interestingly, despite their large size, the firms in the extensive 
group, compared to those in the no-risk management group, do not seem to spend 
significantly more money on acquisition and exploration activities. The Wilcoxon rank sum 
test results reported in column (12) confirm the conclusions drawn for the financial distress 
costs, liquidity, institutional shareholding and managerial shareholding and options 
holdings. However, the median differences between the two variables measuring size are 
not significant suggesting that an important risk management program is not exclusive to 
large firms. 
 
An inspection of the second column of p-values reported in Table V (column 11) suggests 
that firms using extensive levels of risk management have higher cash cost, are larger in 
terms of market value and sales revenues and carry less liquidity than the firms using 
moderately risk management. As predicted, the managers of the firms in the extensive risk 
management group have a greater equity stake value in the firm, fewer unrelated directors 
on their board and less institutional shareholding. Interestingly, managers in the extensive 
group hold more options which would confirm the prediction of Carpenter’s (2000) model 
that managers holding more options do not necessarily hedge less. The results of the non 
parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test reported in column (13) suggest that firms managing   17
extensively risk might be less efficient at the operational level (higher cash cost is), might 
explore more and might carry less liquidity (as predicted). The conclusion concerning the 
manager’s stake value and options holdings, the composition of the board and the 
institutional shareholding remain unchanged. One interesting result shown with this test is 
that firms that would enjoy a greater tax advantage from hedging do not necessarily hedge 
more. 
 
(Insert Tables IV and V) 
 
Overall, the results reported in Table V suggest that firms in the three groups exhibit 
different characteristics. The risk management level adopted by a firm seems to be affected 
by the managerial risk aversion measured both by the value of common shares and the 
number of options held by managers. The existence of financial slack also seems to lead to 
less risk management by financial instruments. And, some financial characteristics, such as 
size and financial distress costs, seem to affect the risk management decision. Finally, taxes 
do not seem to affect the hedging decision. Since the results reported in Table V have a 
univariate aspect and do not control for other potential determinants, we conduct a 
multivariate analysis in the next section 
 
 
5. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
 
A. Results for the single equation model 
 
Empirical evidence reported in Tufano (1996) shows little support for financial theories that 
view the maximization of the firm’s value as a rationale for risk management. However, his 
evidence supports theories that link managerial risk aversion to the hedging decision. In this 
section, we report the regression results for a single equation model. As in Tufano (1996), 
we investigate the determinants of the risk management decision for a dataset of North 
American gold mining firms. However, we employ quarterly rather than annual data over a 
longer period of time (seven years instead of three). Using quarterly data allows a greater 
number of observations and produces results that suffer less from problems related to small 
sample size. Also, such data make it possible to capture more adequately the dynamic 
aspect of the risk management decision. We also report results for a Tobit model in order to 
gauge the impact of the estimation method and compare our results with Tufano’s (1996)
15. 
This section will allows us to check the validity of the theoretical arguments presented in 
the literature without imposing any hypothesis on the debt decision. 
 
The results obtained with a Tobit model are reported in column A of Table VI. Both 
variables used as a proxy for managerial risk aversion have the predicted sign and are 
respectively significant at the five and ten percent level. This result confirms Tufano’s 
(1996) conclusion that managerial risk aversion is an important determinant of the risk 
management decision, and Smith and Stulz’s (1985) prediction that, paying managers with 
                                                           
15 We also tried to run regressions with a random effect Tobit model using only the end-of the year hedge 
ratios in annual tests. Unfortunately, given the small sample size in this case, the random effect model does 
not converge.    18
shares will push them to manage more risks whereas paying them with options will lead 
them to seek more risk. However, according to the reported results, the only argument 
related to the maximisation of the firm’s value that affects the risk management decision is 
the reduction of the financial distress costs. Thus, firms do not manage risk in order to 
reduce their tax liability nor to ensure more internally generated cash flows for investment 
purposes. Neither does size seem also to have any effect on such decision. Moreover, 
according to the coefficients and p-values reported in column A of Table VI, firms carrying 
financial slack do less hedging with financial instruments whereas those suffering from 
serious informational asymmetry will be more active in managing the risks they face.  
 
Overall, the results reported in column A support Tufano’s (1996) conclusions and suggest 
that risk management activities are in large part adopted to maximize the manager’s utility. 
 
Column B of Table VI reports results obtained using the same model, but with a random 
firm effect Tobit specification. This specification is more appropriate for our dataset. 
Unlike the results reported in Column A, the variables proxying the tax advantage of 
hedging and size are significant at the ten and five percent level respectively, suggesting 
that firms manage risk in order to decrease their tax liability, and are more willing to do so 
when they are large. The positive coefficient observed for the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s sales confirms Haushalter (2000) findings that larger firms hedge more. The high 
costs of risk management can explain why larger firms hedge more. Recall that risk 
management involves hiring financial specialists to implement strategies and handle 
sophisticated financial instruments. These activities are usually very expensive and small 
firms might not be able to afford them. In a consistent fashion, the variables relative to the 
managerial risk aversion have the predicted sign and are both significant at the five percent 
level as in Tufano (1996). This result confirms that managerial risk aversion does have a 
considerable effect on risk management decisions. The institutional shareholding variable 
has a negative and significant coefficient at the five percent level confirming that reducing 
information asymmetry costs is also a motive for managing risk. The results reported in 
column B of Table VI also confirm that firms with large financial slack hedge less with 
financial instruments. 
 
Both variables used as proxies for internal corporate governance mechanisms have an 
insignificant coefficient. These results suggest that combining the CEO and the chairman of 
the board positions has no effect on a firm’s risk management activities and this contradicts 
Borokhovich et al (2001) conclusion that the board of directors plays an active role in the 
decision making of such policy. These findings are very interesting especially in light of the 
growing debate concerning how effective corporate governance mechanisms are in solving 
the agency problem in public firms. Thus far, we have reported evidence showing that risk 
management increases the firm’s value through different mechanisms. Consequently, one 
would expect firms with more efficient boards (boards with many unrelated directors) to 
have higher levels of risk management, since it is to the advantage of shareholders. The 
insignificant coefficient we report for the board variable suggest that unrelated directors are 
not acting in the benefit of the shareholders because they do not try to increase the firm’s 
value through risk management. A plausible explanation for the observed passivity of 
unrelated directors is that they lack the background needed to understand the risk 
management activities in the firm and have less information about such policies than inside   19
directors. Consequently, the presence of unrelated directors on the board would not affect 
the risk management policy, not because unrelated directors are unwilling to act for the 
benefit of shareholders but because they are simply unable to understand this complicated 
activity. This argument is supported by the findings of Buckley and Van Der Nat (2003) 
who report a disturbing level of ignorance concerning risk management activities among 
unrelated directors. Finally, the two variable proxying the financial distress costs have a 
positive and significant coefficient at the five percent level suggesting that firms manage 
risk to reduce costs resulting from operational and financial efficiencies. 
 
Roughly speaking, the results presented in column B show that, when we take into account 
the panel aspect of the data, some variables relative to the maximization of the firm’s value 
argument do become statistically significant. The results suggest that managers hedge, not 
only to maximise their utility, but also to maximize the firm’s value by reducing its 
financial distress costs, its tax liability and costs related to informational asymmetry. A 
firm’s risk management activity also appears to be positively related to its size confirming 
the cost argument already mentioned by Stulz (1996). Our results also support the 
conclusion Dionne and Garand (2003) draw concerning the relevance of maximization the 
firm’s value argument in explaining risk management activities. 
 
(Insert Table VI) 
 
B. The results with an endogenous debt decision 
 
Table VII reports the results for the simultaneous equations system. Column (A) contains 
the estimated coefficients for the hedging equation. Interestingly, both leverage and cash 
cost maintain a positive and significant coefficient at the five percent level suggesting that, 
even when we control for the endogenous relation between debt and risk management, 
firms hedge in order to reduce their financial distress costs. This result confirms the first 
hypothesis provided by our theoretical model. The managerial risk aversion argument 
proposed by Smith and Stulz (1985) is also supported since the coefficients of the two 
variables used to proxy it have the predicted sign and are significant at the five percent 
level. Besides this, the results in Table VII suggest that firms manage risk in order to reduce 
the costs of informational asymmetry. Risk management activities seem also to be more 
important in firms where the CEO is also the chairman of the board. This last finding is 
consistent with the argument that risk management can lead to an increase in the manager’s 
utility. As in Tufano (1996), one of the variables proxying the firm’s investment 
opportunities (acquisition in our case) is negatively related to risk management. This 
finding is apparently counterintuitive and contradicts the hypothesis that firms set up risk 
management programs to ensure more internally generated funds for investment purposes. 
However, this result is not surprising if we take into account the negative relation that 
might exist between the acquisition activities and the gold price. Indeed, gold mining firms 
would find it less profitable to acquire new mines when the price of gold is not high enough 
to cover the acquisition costs. Therefore, acquisition expenditures would be lower in 
periods of a bearish gold market, while firms would be more tempted to hedge in this kind 
of market. Unfortunately, the weak significance level of this variable and the insignificant 
coefficient reported for the exploration variable provide little support for this argument. 
Also, when we endogenize the debt decision, the board of directors has no active role in   20
setting the risk management policy; hence, the tax and size arguments loose their 
explanatory power. The coefficient of the quick ratio is positive and significant suggesting 
that risk management with financial instruments and liquidity cushions are not necessarily 
substitutes when the debt is set endogenous. Finally, risk management seems to be more 
popular among US than Canadian firms. This might be caused by the greater liquidity of 
the gold derivatives market in the US
16. Indeed, it is obvious that corporate hedging would 
be more important in liquid markets with a wide choice of instruments and a lower cost of 
hedging. 
 
(Insert Table VII) 
 
The estimated coefficients for the debt equation are shown in column B of Table VII. First, 
the coefficient of the delta percentage is positive but not significant indicating that firms do 
not necessarily hedge to increase their debt capacity as reported in Graham and Rogers 
(2002). In comparison with the results from the risk management equation, it seems that the 
relation between debt and risk management goes mainly in the direction of firms hedging in 
order to decrease the financial distress costs caused by leverage, rather than firms managing 
risk in order to increase their debt capacity. This result also provides some support for the 
second hypothesis drawn from our theoretical model (Equation A3 in Appendix I). Indeed, 
out model shows that hedging has two opposite effects on the firm’s debt level and we were 
unable to determine which effect actually prevails. In the gold mining industry, it would 
seem that both effects are equivalent and almost neutralize each other resulting in an 
insignificant effect of hedging on the debt level. 
 
Second, the debt level is negatively related to the firm’s uniqueness supporting the 
hypothesis that unique firms are more difficult to evaluate and consequently are less able to 
get debt financing. Also, the coefficient obtained for the firm’s operating income suggests 
that the firm’s profitability does not automatically lead it to reduce its financing with debt. 
Indeed, a firm can increase its debt level even if it has important funds generated from its 
operations because of the several advantages provided by this source of financing i.e. the 
tax advantage, the reduction of internal agency costs and the additional control imposed to 
managers…etc. This situation is more likely to occur when the firm has low leverage, 
which is the case in our sample. The results also show that debt is positively related to the 
firm’s exploration expenditures, whereas the coefficient for the book value of property, 
plant and equipment is not significant. This might indicate that financial markets reply 
more on the cash flows from exploration activities than on physical assets, when lending 
money to gold mining firms. Also, the debt level in gold mining firms seems to be 
positively related to the riskiness of their operational activities. Finally, the results suggest 
that US firms are more highly leveraged than their Canadian counterparts. 
 
                                                           
16 For example, according to the triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market 
Activity published by the BIS, the total notional value of gold derivatives outstanding in Canada as of March 
1995 is 4.6 billions of USD while the corresponding amount for the US is 34.1billions of USD. Unfortunately, 
the figures for the commodity derivatives were not available in the 1998 survey. Instead, we report the 
average daily turnover reported for the OTC derivatives market as of April 1998: 33.6 billions of USD for 
Canada and 293.8 billions of USD for the US.    21
Overall, the results presented in this section show that even when we control for the 
endogenous relation between the risk management and the debt decisions, firms hedge in 
order to reduce their financial distress and informational asymmetry costs, and to increase 
their manager’s utility. The tax and size arguments loose their explanatory power. When we 
endogenize the debt decision, the board of directors has no active role in the risk 
management decision whereas having the CEO and the chairman of the board positions 
filled by the same person does lead to a higher risk management level. Furthermore, 
Graham and Rogers’ (2002) findings that risk management increases the firm’s debt 





Recent empirical work by Grahams and Rogers (2002) and Borokhovich et al (2004) 
combined with theoretical models already proposed by Stulz (1996) and Leland (1998) 
show the need to model the debt as endogenous when studying risk management 
determinants. 
 
This paper extends this literature. We first propose a theoretical model where the debt and 
the risk management decisions are set simultaneously as a background for our empirical 
tests. Our model suggests that, under a standard debt contract, hedging has two opposite 
effects on the firm’s debt level which means that it will not always lead to a higher debt 
capacity. 
 
We then run empirical tests to investigate risk management determinants. We construct a 
database that contains detailed quarterly information on risk management operations, as 
well as financial and managerial characteristics for a sample of 36 North American gold 
mining firms over a seven years period. We also use the simulation procedure proposed by 
Graham and Smith (1999) to construct a variable that captures adequately the tax incentive 
to hedge for both US and Canadian firms. In fact, Graham and Smith (1999) apply the 
American fiscal code to both US and Canadian firms in COMPUSTAT, which would 
provide inadequate estimates of the tax incentive to hedge for Canadian firms. We 
overcome this problem by constructing for each firm a tax save variable that uses the 
legislation of its home country. 
 
We first run regressions for a single equation model in order to compare our results to 
previous work within the gold mining industry and to isolate how they are related to the 
debt endogeneity hypothesis. In this case, we provide evidence confirming Tufano’s 
conclusion that managerial risk aversion is an important determinant of the risk 
management strategy. Moreover, our evidence shows that the financial distress costs, the 
information asymmetry costs, size and taxes are also important determinants of the decision 
to hedge. Unlike Tufano (1996), our findings suggest that risk management is an activity 
that not only maximizes the managerial utility but also the firm’s value as stated in Dionne 
and Garand (2003). However, hedging to finance investment opportunities seems to be 
irrelevant as a motive. The reported results also support the argument proposed by Stulz 
(1996) alleging that risk management is an expensive activity that small firms might not be 
able to afford. Interestingly, the composition of the board of directors seems to have no   22
impact on the decision to hedge, no more than does not separating between the CEO and 
the chairman of the board positions. 
 
In a second step, we test empirically the predictions of our theoretical model. To do so, we 
use a simultaneous equations system and extend the minimum distance estimator proposed 
by Lee (1995). Our conclusions remain unchanged for the arguments related to information 
asymmetry, financial distress costs and managerial risk aversion. However, when we 
endogenize the debt decision, taxes and size no longer constitute motives for the firm to 
hedge, and the non separation between the CEO and the chairman of the board positions 
does seem to have some impact on setting risk management policies. An important 
implication of our empirical evidence is that firms do not use hedging to increase their debt 
capacity as stated in Graham and Rogers (2002) but mainly to reduce their financial distress 
costs. 
   23
TABLE I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE DELTA PERCENTAGE 
The delta % is the fraction of the gold production that is hedged over the next three years. It is our measure of the firm’s 
risk management activity. This table reports the descriptive statistics of the delta percentage. 
 
Delta % (1993-1999)  Number of observations 
Exactly 0  88 
0
 - 0.1  125 
















TABLE II: DISTRIBUTION OF THE DELTA PERCENTAGE OVER THE 
SAMPLE PERIOD 
This table reports the distribution of the delta percentage over the years as well as the descriptive statistics for each year.   
   
Year Delta%  Number of 
observations 
Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
1993 16 0.0233  0.0000  0.0448 
1994 50 0.1992  0.0777  0.3003 
1995 52 0.1632  0.0754  0.2618 
1996 55 0.1886  0.1076  0.2446 
1997 108  0.2374  0.1692  0.2342 
1998 123  0.3068  0.2309  0.2864 
1999 105  0.3058  0.1854  0.3209   24
TABLE III: SUMMARY OF THE VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
 
What we want to measure  How we measure it 
The risk management activity  The delta of the risk management portfolio 
held by the firm divided by its expected 
gold production. 
The book value of the firm’s long term debt 
divided by its market value.  
The financial distress costs 
The operating cost of producing one ounce 
of gold, excluding all non-cash items such 
as depreciation, amortization and other 
financial costs   
The Informational asymmetry  Percentage of shares held by institutions  
The tax advantage of hedging  The tax savings resulting from a five 
percent reduction in the volatility of the 
taxable income. This variable is constructed 
using a modified version of the Graham and 
Smith (1999) approach  
Size   The natural logarithm of the firm’s sales 
revenues 
The firm’s market value  The number of common shares multiplied 
by their unit market price plus the number 
of preferred shares multiplied by their value 
at par plus the book value of debt.  
The firm’s exploration expenditures scaled 
by the firm’s market value 
The firm’s investment opportunities 
 
The firm’s acquisitions expenditures scaled 
by the firm’s market value 
The number of common shares held by 
D&O multiplied by their market price 
Managerial risk aversion 
The number of options held by D&O 
Independence of the board  The number of unrelated directors as a 
percentage of the board size and a dummy 
equal one if the CEO is also the COB. A 
director is defined as unrelated if he is 
independent of the firm’s management and 
free from any interest and any business or 
relationship that could be perceived to 
affect its ability to act as a director with a 
view to the best interests of the firm, other 
than interests arising from shareholdings. A 
director who is a former employee of the 
firm is defined as related.   25
The firm’s liquidity  The quick ratio defined as the value of cash 
on hand, short term investments and client’s 
accounts divided by the short term 
liabilities.  
The firm’s collateral value  The book value of property, plant and 
equipment divided by the book value of 
total assets. 
The non debt tax shield   Depreciation and amortization divided by 
the book value of total assets. 
The tax advantage of debt  The firm’s marginal tax rate defined as the 
additional taxes paid on an additional $ of 
income. 
The firm’s uniqueness  Selling, general and administrative expenses 
divided by the net sales.  
The firm’s profitability  Operating income scaled by the firm’s sales 
The firm’s operational risk  The volatility of the % change in the 
operating income. 
Nationality   A dummy equal 1 if the firm is US, 0 if it is 
Canadian. 
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TABLE IV: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
In this table, Tax save is the fiscal benefit from reducing the firm earnings volatility by five percent, scaled by the firm sales revenues; 
Leverage is the book value of the long term debt divided by the firm’s market value; Cash cost is the operating cost of producing an 
ounce of gold, excluding all non cash items such as depreciation, amortisation and other financial costs; Sales are the firm’s sales at the 
end of the quarter; VM is the firm’s market value defined as the number of common shares multiplied by their price at the end of quarter 
plus the number of preferred shares issued multiplied by their value at par plus the book value of debt; Exploration and Acquisition are 
respectively the exploration and acquisition expenditures during the quarter both scaled by the firm’s market value; the quick ratio is the 
value of the cash on hand, short term investments and clients accounts divided by the short term liabilities; Institutional shareholding is 
the percentage of shares held by institutions; D&O CS Value is the value of the common shares owned by the firm’s directors and 
officers and is calculated by multiplying the number of CS they hold by the share price at the quarter end; D&O nber of options is the 
number of options held by directors and officers at the quarter end; % of unrelated is the number of unrelated directors divided by the 
board size. BV of pp&eq is the book value of property, plant and equipment scaled by the book value of total assets; Dep&Amt is 
depreciation and amortisation during the quarter scaled by the book value of total assets at the quarter end; MTR is the simulated 
marginal tax rate; Sgl&Adm is the Selling, general and administrative expenses during the quarter divided by the net sales of the firm 
during the same quarter; Operating  income is the Operating income during the quarter scaled by the firm sales; Volatility of % change in 
OI is the volatility of the percentage change in the quarterly operating income.  
 
Variable  N Mean  Median  Standard-
deviation 
Cash cost  516 247  239  61.7266 
Tax save   494 0.1381  0.0371  0.2822 
Leverage  506 0.1186  0.0842  0.1271 
Ln (Sales)  513 3.3220  3.1247  1.3674 
Acquisition  517 0.0119  0.0000  0.0774 
Exploration  517 0.0037  0.0022  0.0088 
Quick ratio  517 3.1937  2.2022  3.0946 
Institutional shareholding  517 0.1766  0.0000  0.2536 
D&O CS Value   517 16.9145  2.3021  46.8042 
D&O nber of options  517 0.8844  0.4715  1.4494 
% of unrelated  517 0.7018  0.7143  0.1580 
Operating  income  513 -0.0761 0.1797 1.1046 
Sgl&Adm  513 0.1483  0.1105  0.1854 
Volatility of % change in OI  485 12.9680  2.1128  125.3759 
Dep & Amt  516 0.0181  0.0152  0.0176 
BV of pp&eq  516 0.6187  0.6463  0.1713 
MTR  497 0.1578  0.1625  0.1248 
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TABLE V: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
This table reports univariate analysis for the variables proposed to explain the risk management decision. The sample is segmented according to the risk management level adopted by the firm. The first 
group uses no risk management, the second group uses moderately risk management and the third group uses extensively risk management. The last four columns report p-values corresponding to the t-
test of the differences of means between the groups and the significance level of the non parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. The significant values at the 95% level are in bold. All independent variables 
are measured one quarter prior to the quarter in which the risk management information is available. In the Table, delta % is the fraction of the gold production that is hedged for the three future years; 
Tax save is the fiscal benefit from reducing the firm earnings volatility by five percent, scaled by the firm sales revenues; Leverage is the book value of the long term debt divided by the firm’s market 
value; Cash cost is the operating cost of producing an ounce of gold, excluding all non cash items such as depreciation, amortisation and other financial costs; Sales are the firm’s sales at the end of the 
quarter; VM is the firm’s market value defined as the number of common shares multiplied by their price at the end of quarter plus the number of preferred shares issued multiplied by their value at par 
plus the book value of debt; Exploration and acquisition are respectively the exploration and acquisition expenditures during the quarter both scaled by the firm’s market value; the quick ratio is the value 
of the cash on hand, short term investments and clients accounts divided by the short term liabilities; Institutional shareholding is the percentage of shares held by institutions; D&O CS Value is the value 
of the common shares owned by the firm’s directors and officers and is calculated by multiplying the number of CS they hold by the share price at the quarter end; D&O nber of options is the number of 
options held by directors and officers at the quarter end; % of unrelated is the number of unrelated directors divided by the board size.  
p-values of differences   Delta    =0% 
None (1) 
Delta between 0-50% 
Moderate (2) 
Delta>50% 
Extensive (3)  Mean  Median 
 mean  Std 
dev 
med mean  Std 
dev 
med mean  Std 
dev 
med  (1) vs. (3) (2) vs. (3) (1) vs. (3) (2) vs. (3)
Delta %  0 0 0  0.167  0.126  0.138  0.757  0.190  0.703         
Tax save    0.171 0.229 0.070  0.114  0.163  0.059 0.148  0.392  0.017  0.633  0.424  0.000 0.000 
Leverage  0.088 0.105 0.040  0.118  0.124  0.094 0.137  0.135  0.086  0.007  0.227  0.001  0.291 
Cash cost ($US/ oz)  232  50  221  245  60 240  265 69 250 0.000 0.017 0.001  0.028 
Sales ($US, millions)  41  57  15 67  83 35  92  122  17 0.000  0.067 0.117 0.313 
VM ($US, millions)  790  1200  381 1337 1691 681  2601  3932 360  0.000 0.003 0.192 0.149 
Acquisition   0.002 0.014  0  0.013  0.080  0  0.016  0.105 0  0.225  0.798  0.113  0.852 
Exploration   0.003 0.003 0.002  0.004  0.004  0.003 0.005 0.019 0.001  0.404  0.510  0.123  0.004 
Quick ratio    4.547 3.818 3.402  3.093  2.947  2.194 2.512  2.736  1.834  0.000 0.080 0.000 0.030 
Institutional 
shareholding 
0.284  0.298  0.199  0.169  0.261 0  0.091  0.134 0  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 
D&O CS Value  
($US, millions)         
3.463 5.288 0.947  9.924  21.081 2.621  56.587 94.252 4.339  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.053 
D&O nber of options 
(millions)      
0.436 0.520 0.330  0.853  1.667  0.421 1.390  1.224  0.679  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
% of unrelated   0.670 0.157 0.667  0.722  0.154  0.742 0.652  0.157  0.667  0.424  0.000  0.128  0.000 
Number of 
observations 
88 314  92   28 
Table VI: RESULTS FOR THE SINGLE EQUATION MODEL 
This table reports the results for a random firm effect Tobit model estimation of the whole sample. The dependent variable in the 
regression is the delta percentage defined as the fraction of the gold production that is hedged for the three future years. The delta% is 
measured at the quarter end. The independent variables are measured one quarter prior to the one in which the risk management data is 
available. In the Table, Tax save is the fiscal benefit from reducing the firm’s earnings volatility by five percent, scaled by the firm’s 
sales revenues; Leverage is the book value of the long term debt divided by the firm’s market value; Cash cost is the operating cost of 
producing an ounce of gold, excluding all non cash items such as depreciation, amortisation and other financial costs; Exploration and 
Acquisition  are respectively the exploration and acquisition expenditures during the quarter both scaled by the firm’s market value at the 
quarter end; The quick ratio is the value of the cash on hand, short term investments and clients accounts divided by the short term 
liabilities; Institutional shareholding is the percentage of shares held by institutions; D&O CS Value is the number of the common shares 
owned by directors and officers multiplied by the share price at the quarter end; D&O nber of options is the number of options held by 
directors and officers at the quarter end; % of unrelated is the number of unrelated directors divided by the board size. Dummy COB is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chief of the board and 0 otherwise; Dummy US is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the firm is US and 0 if it is Canadian. The significant values at the 95% level are in bold, those at the 90% marked with an asterisk 
 
  Tobit specification (A)  Random effect Tobit 
specification(B) 
  Slope p-value Slope   p-value 
Constant  -0.1886
* 0.051  -0.1708 0.039 
Tax save   0.0973 0.101  0.0833
* 0.086 
Leverage  0.4855 0.000  0.7443 0.000 
Cash  cost  0.0015 0.000  0.0006 0.002 
Ln (sales)  0.0102 0.379  0.0666 0.000 
Acquisition  0.1262 0.374  0.0969 0.350 
Exploration  1.6202 0.210 -0.8031 0.416 
Quick  ratio  -0.0215 0.000 -0.0087 0.013 
Institutional 
shareholding 
-0.1257 0.016 -0.3683 0.000 
D&O CS Value   0.0032  0.000  0.0006  0.046 
D&O number of options  -0.0175
* 0.059  -0.0213 0.004 
% of unrelated  0.0280 0.745  0.0615 0.376 
Dummy COB  0.0237 0.369 -0.0068 0.776 
Dummy US  -0.1496  0.000  0.0347 0.293 
Sigma u, (random effect)     0.2311 0.000 
Sigma  e  0.2448 0.009  0.1785 0.000 
Log likelihood  -71.4345   12.6552  
Number of observations  485   485   
Uncensored 
observations 
404   404   
Censored observations  81   81   
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 Table VII: RESULTS FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION SYSTEM 
This table reports the results of the estimation with the minimum distance method of the simultaneous equations system. The first 
equation in the system models the risk management decision in the firm, and the second equation models the debt decision. In this case, 
debt and hedging decisions are supposed to be taken in the same time, at the quarter end. The dependent variables in the two equations 
are respectively the delta % and the firm’s leverage. The independent variables are measured one quarter prior to the one in which the 
risk management and debt data is available. In this Table, delta %  is the fraction of the gold production that is hedged for the three future 
years; Tax save is the fiscal benefit from reducing the firm earnings volatility by five percent, scaled by the firm sales revenues; Leverage 
is the book value of the long term debt divided by the firm’s market value; Cash cost is the operating cost of producing an ounce of gold, 
excluding all non cash items such as depreciation, amortisation and other financial costs; Ln (sales) is the natural logarithm of the firm 
sales during the quarter; Exploration and Acquisition are respectively the exploration and acquisition expenditures during the quarter 
scaled by the firm’s market value at the quarter end; The quick ratio is the value of the cash on hand, short term investments and clients 
accounts divided by the short term liabilities; Institutional shareholding is the percentage of shares held by institutions; D&O CS Value is 
the number of the common shares owned by directors and officers multiplied by the share price at the quarter end; D&O nber of options 
is the number of options held by directors and officers at the quarter end; Dummy US is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is US 
and 0 otherwise; % of unrelated is the number of unrelated directors divided by the board size; Dummy COB is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm’s CEO is also the chief of the board ; BV of pp&eq is the book value of property, plant and equipment scaled by the 
book value of total assets; Dep&Amt is depreciation and amortisation during the quarter scaled by the book value of total assets at the 
quarter end; MTR is the simulated marginal tax rate; Sgl&Adm is the Selling, general and administrative expenses during the quarter 
divided by the net sales of the firm during the same quarter; Operating  income is the Operating income during the quarter scaled by the 
firm sales; Volatility of % change in OI is the volatility of the percentage change in the quarterly operating income. Exploration was 
multiplied by 1000 to fit in the software. The significant values at the 95% level are in bold. 
 
  RM equation(A)  Debt equation(B) 
  Slope   p-value  Slope   p-value 
Constant  -0.1250 0.335  0.0629 0.004 
Tax save   -0.0469 0.791     
Leverage 3.8125  0.023    
Delta %      0.0464 0.355 
Cash cost  0.0003  0.030    
Ln (sales)  0.0186 0.594  0.0127 0.117 
Acquisition  -0.5469 0.097  0.1406 0.235 
Exploration  -0.0011 0.647  0.0030 0.008 
Quick ratio  0.0132  0.002    
Institutional shareholding  -0.7461  0.000    
D&O CS Value   0.0022 0.005    
D&O nber of options  -0.0527 0.016    
% of unrelated  0.0273 0.849     
Dummy COB  0.0605 0.037    
Operating  income     0.0112 0.043 
Sgl&Adm     -0.1914 0.002 
Dep & Amt     0.3281  0.222 
BV of pp&eq     0.0039  0.894 
MTR     -0.0781  0.266 
Volatility of % change in OI     0.0001 0.038 
Dummy US  0.1455  0.047  0.0820  0.001 
Number of observations  485  485  
Uncensored observations  405  401  
Censored observations  80  84  30 
APPENDIX I 
 
The problem for the firm is to choose simultaneously the level of hedging h and the face 
value of its debt F in order to maximise the following program:  
 
[] []









+ − − + − + − + +





) 1 ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) 1 (
) ( ) 1 (
0 0
0 0
r D x G F dx x g c xw x h h w










From (3) we have 







xF and corresponds to the minimal value of x that 
allows firms to avoid bankruptcy. Since  F x is a function of both F and h, we need to 










































 − + − + −
0 ) ( ) ( ) (

















x cg x G
σ λ σ
λ


















































λ will be grater than 1 as long as 1-h 0 > +α and 0 ) 1 ( 0 > + − α w F . Equating both 
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To isolate the relation between 
* F  and 
* h we derive this last expression w.r.t. 
* h  
 
 








































F α σ  (A3) 
 
The first term in equation (A3) indicates that an increase in h reduces the firm’s risk and 
gives her access to a higher debt capacity by reducing the face value of debt. The second 
term describes an indirect effect via the hazard rate. Under the normal assumption for x, the 
default intensity is an increasing function of  F x  which is also an increasing function of h 
under the standard debt contract assumption. Therefore, increasing the hedging activities 
will increase both  * dh
dxF and the default intensity. This will lead to a second positive effect 
between the firm’s face value and its hedging activities.  32 
APPENDIX II 
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1it y and  *
2it y  are respectively the risk management level and the long-term debt level 
targeted by the firm,  it X1 and  it X2 are ( 1 1× k ) and ( 1 2 × k ) vectors of exogenous variables 
(including a constant term) supposed to affect respectively the risk management and the 
debt decisions. The terms u and e correspond respectively to the random firm effect and 
error components. α ’s andβ ’s are parameters to be estimated. In this case, only maximum 
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1it y ,0), maximum ( *
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which give us the following equation: 
 






















































































B we can rewrite 
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η . We replace  it 1 ε  and  it 2 ε  by their respective 
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where  1 J  and  2 J are the exclusion matrices constructed such as:  it it X J X 1 1 ′ = ′  
and it it X J X 2 2 ′ = ′ . 34 
APPENDIX III 
 
Each equation of the reduced form corresponds to a random effect Tobit model. The 
general form of a random firm effect Tobit model can be written as: 
 
*
it it y y =   if  0
* > it y  where  it i it it l X y γ η + + ′ =
*  
0 = it y  otherwise 
 
where  it y  is the dependent variable censored at zero,  it X is a ( 1 × k ) matrix of exogenous 
variables (including a constant term). The terms l and γ  correspond respectively to the 
random firm effect and error terms. η’s are parameters to be estimated. We assume that 
) , 0 ( ~
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where Φis the normal cdf. 
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where ϕ is the normal pdf. 
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